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The emergence and maintenance of punishment to protect the commons
remains an open puzzle in social and biological sciences. Even in societies
where pro-social punishing is common, some individuals seek to cheat the
system if they see a chance to do so—and public goods are often maintained
in spite of cheaters who do not contribute. We present a model accounting for
all possible strategies in a public goods game with punishment. While most
models of punishment restrict the set of possible behaviours, excluding see-
mingly paradoxical anti-social strategies from the start, we show that these
strategies can play an important role in explaining large-scale cooperation
as observed in human societies. We find that coordinated punishment can
emerge from individual interactions, but the stability of the associated insti-
tutions is limited owing to anti-social and opportunistic behaviour. In
particular, coordinated anti-social punishment can undermine cooperation
if individuals cannot condition their behaviour on the existence of institutions
that punish. Only when we allow for observability and conditional beha-
viours do anti-social strategies no longer threaten cooperation. This is due
to a stable coexistence of a minority supporting pro-social institutions and
those who only cooperate if such institutions are in place. This minority of
supporters is enough to guarantee substantial cooperation under a wide
range of conditions. Our findings resonate with the empirical observation
that public goods are resilient to opportunistic cheaters in large groups of
unrelated individuals. They also highlight the importance of letting evolution,
and not modellers, decide which strategies matter.1. Introduction
Most modern societies have put in place institutions that support and promote
collective action. Understanding the origin of these institutions is an important
challenge across biological and social sciences [1]. The outstanding capacity of
humans to engage in large-scale cooperation often relies on these institutiona-
lized enforcement mechanisms [2]. Centralized institutions for cooperation
also have experimental and empirical support [3,4], but explaining how these
institutions arise from individual incentives is an open problem [5]. Here, we
propose that these institutions play a role in enabling cooperation, not only
by implementing punishment against free-riders [6–8], but also by means of
their visibility, which enables agents to condition their actions on whether
these institutions are present or not.
Punishment provides a possible solution to the problem of collective action
[9–14]. The vast majority of theoretical and experimental work focuses on pro-
social peer punishment, exerted by peers and individually directed towards
those who do not cooperate [15–20]. Anti-social peer punishment is instead
directed towards those who do contribute to the public good [21]. Experiments
and models have shown that anti-social punishment can diminish the effective-
ness of punishment in promoting cooperation [22–25]. In many instances,
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Figure 1. Description of the strategy sets. (a) The 64 strategies taking part in the game are characterized by their contribution to the punishment pool (none (N),
pro-social (W), anti-social (M) or both (B)) and their action for each institutional set-up. In addition, in an optional game, we have the loner strategy which neither
punishes nor gets punished. (b) The 65 strategies can be reduced to 21 by assuming consistent actions—players do not support pools that punish them. Alter-
natively, one can focus on nine unconditional strategies, where actions are not affected by the punishment set-up. Iterated removal of dominated strategies results in




2however, punishment is not individual, but a coordinated
action of many individuals [26]. An extreme form of such
coordination is the kind of pool punishment that emerged
as the typical way of punishment in modern human societies:
individuals commit an investment into a pool to pay for the
punishment of those who do not comply with a social norm
[6,27–29]. Here, we show that pro-social punishment can
withstand the presence of cheaters and anti-social behaviour,
but this outcome only emerges when considering all possible
strategies in a public goods game. This result highlights the
importance of avoiding artificial restrictions in the strategy
set of evolutionary models.
We study the evolutionary dynamics of coordinated anti-
social punishment and ask whether the associated coordi-
nated punishment can emerge, potentially undermining
cooperation. Our model allows for the evolutionary compe-
tition between anti-social and pro-social punishment. We
consider two main scenarios. (i) Observable institutions
allow individuals to condition their actions on the existence
of punishment institutions. (ii) If institutions cannot be
observed, individuals are unable to condition their behaviour.
When punishment is not observable, anti-social punishment
triggers a collapse of the public good. If institutions are
observable, cooperation can be established and stabilized by
pro-social punishment, even in the face of anti-social behaviour.
2. The model
2.1. A game of cooperation with institutional
punishment
Our model follows Sigmund et al. [6] in the basic set-up of an
optional public goods game between n players with three
stages. (i) The first stage is institutional commitment, in
which players may commit funds to an institution that will
later punish free-riders or cooperators. (ii) The second stage
is the public goods game, in which individuals may decide
whether to contribute or not to a public good. (iii) The
third stage is punishment, in which players are fined in
accordance to the institutions in place.In the institutional commitment stage (i), participants
choose what kind of institution they want to support. They
can support pro-social punishment directed to defectors,
or anti-social punishment of cooperators, both, or none.
Funding an institution costs a fixed amount γ if the
punishment takes place. An institution is established—
and therefore costly—only if there are at least k players
contributing to it.
(ii) During the public goods stage, players use the infor-
mation about the institutions in place, choosing whether they
contribute an amount c > 0. Contributions are multiplied by a
factor r > 1 and distributed among the n− 1 other players [30].
(iii) During the punishment stage, agents are fined accord-
ing to the institutions in place, and the amount of players
supporting the corresponding institutions. Non-contributors
are punished by an amount βmultiplied by the number of sup-
porters of the pro-social institution. Contributors are punished
by an amount β multiplied by the number of supporters of
the anti-social pool.
Since the game is optional, we also let agents opt out of
the game altogether. Those that do not take part in the
game obtain a loner pay-off σ > 0, regardless of the decisions
of others [31]. An optional game, therefore, includes the
‘loner’ strategy, whereas a non-optional game precludes it.
When agents can decide what to do depending on the
existence of punishment institutions, a large strategy set
emerges, as follows. In the first stage of the game, an individ-
ual decides their institutional support; with options for
supporting no institution (N), only a pro-social institution
(W), only an anti-social institution (M) or both institutions
(B)—thus institutional support entails four possibilities. In
addition, agents also decide whether to contribute or not to
the public good, contingent on the institutional arrangement
in place; i.e. cooperate or defect given there is no institution,
cooperate or defect when there is a pro-social institution only,
what to do when there is only an anti-social institution, and
what to do when both institutions are in place—thus, we
have 24 possibilities. This yields in total 4 × 24 = 64 strategies.
If we further make the game optional and include the loner




3In the analysis that follows we will focus on different
subsets of this large strategy set. These subsets will also
imply different assumptions in the game. In particular, we
study a set of nine non-conditional strategies, in which
cooperation or defection does not depend on institutional
arrangements—this is equivalent to institutions that cannot
be observed. We also study the set of all 65 strategies,
whose analysis will be shown equivalent to that arising
from the set of 21 consistent strategies. A consistent strategy
is such that a player will not contribute to an institution that
would punish her actions (figure 1b).
2.2. Evolutionary dynamics
The game described above determines the pay-off of each
player in the population. We calculate the average pay-off
across all possible configurations of groups given the current
numbers of each type in the population, such that all
players using the same strategy have the same pay-off π.
This pay-off determines how many players will adopt the
corresponding strategy, as successful strategies spread in a
finite population in proportion to their relative fitness. We
consider a Moran process, where a single individual chooses
a new strategy in each time step with probability proportional
to fitness f. We assume an exponential pay-off to fitness map-
ping [32,33], such that fitness is given by f = exp [+ωπ], where
ω is the intensity of selection; see electronic supplementary
material for details. In addition, there is a small probability μ
that an individual switches to a new random type. In our
simulations, we focus on the case of population size N = 50,
mutation rate μ = 0.001, and intensity of selection ω = 10.3. Results
We study which strategies are favoured by an evolutionary
process. Under small mutation rates, the dynamics of the
evolutionary process is confined to edges between two
strategies [34,35]. Therefore, it is instructive to first compare
pay-offs between any two strategies. A full overview of the
(1/2) × 65 × 64 = 2080 strategy pairs is possible, but hard to
grasp. We thus start by reducing the size of this large strategy
set, making further assumptions on the nature of possible
strategies.
3.1. Non-observable institutions
In the simplest case, individuals cannot condition their
actions on the existence of a punishment institution [6].
This is equivalent to punishment institutions that cannot
be observed. This case leads to nine strategies, as follows.
Individuals have four options to support institutions multi-
plied by two possible actions in the public goods game. In
addition, individuals can choose to abstain from the game.
Out of these nine strategies, four are dominated by others.
However, instead of neglecting these strategies from the
beginning, we include them in our computational model
and let evolution decide whether they play any role. Pro-
social institutions can promote temporary cooperation, even
when fines are exclusively directed towards defectors and
not used to stabilize punishment [6]. But this kind of model
assumes that anti-social institutions are excluded. When
allowing for anti-social institutions, cooperation can not
only be undermined by defectors not supporting any
institution but also by defectors that in addition set up ananti-social punishment institution and stretch their relative
advantage (figure 2). As a consequence, more players tend
to abstain from the public goods game and—more impor-
tantly—fewer players cooperate. Thus, anti-social institution
supporters temporarily invade. This dynamics triggers a
sizeable reduction in cooperation as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2 also shows two unstable fixed points: between
the pro-social and the anti-social institution (WCCCC and
MDDDD), and between the pro-social institution and defec-
tors (WCCCC and NDDDD). The existence of these unstable
fixed points can be illustrated from the competition between
the two associated strategies. In the case of WCCCC and
NDDDD, the associated pay-offs in a population with j
cooperating players are
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For j = 1, we have πWCCCC < πNDDDD when the costs of
cooperation and supporting the institution outweigh the
fine imposed on the defectors and the additional benefit
they get from the public goods (due to the setting where a
cooperating player does not benefit from her own contri-
bution), −γ − c < (cr− β(n − 1)/N − 1). This condition will
always be fulfilled for large N. In this case, defectors
cannot be invaded by cooperating supporters of a pro-
social institution. For j = n − 1, the condition for πWCCCC >
πNDDDD reduces to +γ + c < β(n − 1), i.e. the costs of
cooperation and supporting the institution must be smaller
than the fine imposed on the defectors. Thus, cooperating
supporters of a pro-social institution cannot be invaded by
defectors. Since neither of the two strategies can invade the
others (and since the pay-offs are linear in j), this results in
a bi-stability.
A similar argument holds for the pair MDDDD and
WCCCC. A more comprehensive (numerical) analysis that
includes all pairs of these nine strategies is presented in the
electronic supplementary material.
The paths via such bi-stabilities are not prevalent in the
computer simulations that will typically follow the paths
highlighted in the figure. Four different cycles are prevalent:
the first one, L→NCCCC→NDDDD→ L, has already been
described in Hauert et al. [31]; the second one, L→WCCCC→
NCCCC→NDDDD→ L, additionally emerges in the insti-
tutional punishment model of Sigmund et al. [6]; while
the remaining two, L→NCCCC→MDDDD→ L and L→
NCCCC→MDDDD→NDDDD→ L, emerge only in the
presence of anti-social punishment institutions.
One may argue that an anti-social institution should
never arise because cooperators can be invaded by defectors
through an easier path without any anti-social punishment.
However, this argument also applies to the transition from


































Figure 2. Evolutionary dynamics for the nine unconditional strategies. (a) Typical simulation run over 140 000 time steps shows different cycles in which strategies
replace each other, the dominated strategies that punish themselves are only present in low abundance (colour code for the strategies as in the other panels).
Because of the low mutation rate, the abundances are typically close to 0% or 100%. (b) The stationary distribution obtained from computer simulations—four
strategies from [6] only, without anti-social punishment, versus all unconditional strategies. Averages are taken over 300 independent repetitions, each running for
5 × 106 generations, averaging the second half of each replicate. The inclusion of the anti-social institution (MDDDD), which from the outside is paradoxical and
should play no role in evolution, reduces the level of cooperation. (c) Pairwise invasion diagram for the five strategies that are not dominated. Circles represent the
strategies, arrows indicate the direction of selection. Bold arrows represent the paths that are prevalent in computer simulations. The dynamics can follow several
intertwined cycles, e.g. L→ NCCCC→ MDDDD→ NDDDD→ L; see main text (we use our default set of game parameters n = 5, σ = 1, c = 1, r = 3, γ = 0.7, β




4pool, but also without any punishment. The crucial difference
is that, while the pro-social pools can rise to high abundance
[6], the anti-social behaviour only plays an important role
in facilitating the emergence of other strategies without
becoming prevalent itself. The complexity of implementing
an anti-social and a pro-social institution per se is the same.
Their asymmetry arises only from evolutionary competition.
Notably, figure 2b shows that artificially taking out see-
mingly unimportant strategies has an effect on the
predicted level of cooperation. For our default set of par-
ameters, we observe a slight increase in loners, from 44% to
46%. Likewise, defection increases by about 4% and the over-
all level of cooperation decreases by 6% through the
introduction of the anti-social punishment institution.
3.2. Observable institutions
In many cases, information on punishment pools may be
available before players need to make a decision on theircontribution, such that players can condition their actions
on the existence of institutions [26,28,29]. For example, crim-
inals are arguably less likely to offend if they know an
institution is in place to punish them [36]—although see
also [37]. First, we focus on consistent conditional strategies
(figure 1) which do not punish themselves: if individuals
support a pro-social institution, they cooperate if that insti-
tution is in place. If individuals support an anti-social
institution, they defect if that institution is in place. Thus,
they do not support both institutions at the same time. More-
over, if they cooperate (defect) under a single institution, they
also cooperate (defect) when both institutions exist. This set
contains four strategies that support the pro-social institution,
W ○ C ○ C (where the entries ○ are either C or D), and four
strategies that support the anti-social institution, M ○ ○ DD.
In addition, we have 12 strategies that do not support any
institution, N ○ ○ ○ ○, where the four strategies N ○ CCD and N
○ DDC are excluded. Finally, we have the option to abstain

















































Figure 3. Evolutionary dynamics for the 20 consistent conditional strategies. (a) Evolutionary dynamics between pairs of strategies. We only depict invasions that are
prevalent in the dynamics under strong selection. Given sufficient time, stable coexistences between two kinds of players emerge: those that support pro-social
punishment and those not supporting any institution, but cooperating in the presence of pro-social punishment. For simplicity, the diagram focuses on a non-
optional game: adding the loner strategy creates a fast path from defection, via loners, into either side of the stable mixture. (b) There are 12 different
stable coexistences with similar abundance based on the four strategies supporting pro-social punishment and the three opportunistic strategies that cooperate
in the presence, but defect in the absence, of coordinated pro-social punishment. We group these strategies in the cases of non-optional and optional public
goods games. Averages taken as described in figure 2. (c) The probability that a pro-social pool is implemented in the coexistence decreases with increasing




5Electronic supplementary material, figure S1 summarizes
the dynamics between the associated 210 (=(1/2) × 21 × 20)
pairs of consistent conditional strategies. In this set of
strategies, no strategy is strictly dominated. The evolutionary
dynamics is governed by stable coexistences between a min-
ority of players that support the pro-social institution, W ○ C ○
C (called I below), and opportunists that cooperate only when
the pro-social institution is in place [28], NDC ○ ○ (called O
below). As long as a single supporter of the institution can
induce its existence, k = 1, their pay-off is πI = r c− c− γ. The
probability that a focal opportunist is in a group that contains
at least one supporter of the pro-social institution is 1− xn−1,
where x is the fraction of opportunists, who obtain a pay-off
rc− c in that case. If opportunists are alone, no one cooperates
and their pay-off is zero, such that their average pay-off
becomes πO = (rc− c)(1− xn−1). The condition πI = πO leads





The probability that an institution is implemented in a
group is then 1− (x*)n, i.e. a small fraction of supporters of
the institution can induce high levels of cooperation (figure 3).
The resulting stable coexistences are remarkably resilient
to evolutionary invasions. We can see this by doing a pair-
wise analysis, and considering strategies W ○ C ○ C and
NDC ○ ○, where the entry in ○ is irrelevant (and the last
entry in W ○ C ○ C follows from our restriction to consistent
strategies). This coexistence cannot be invaded by any other
single mutant.— Players that cooperate in the absence of an institution,
NCC ○ ○, would be exploited by the NDC ○ ○ resident.
— Those that defect in the presence of an institution, NDD ○○,
would suffer from punishment.
— Any player supporting the anti-social institution would
obtain a lower pay-off than the players in the stable coex-
istence: there, both players obtain −γ + rc− c. A single
supporter of the anti-social institution would at most get
−γ + r c− β. This assumes that, in the presence of both
institutions, all the other players cooperate and that at
least one individual contributed to a pro-social institution.
As β > c, this pay-off is always smaller than the pay-off of
the two resident types. Therefore, supporters of an anti-
social institution cannot invade.
Thus, the coexistence between W ○ C ○ C and NDC ○ ○ is
stable against single mutants. As we have made no assump-
tion on ○, this holds for all such strategies. There is no other
pairwise stable coexistence in the system.
Although this theoretical analysis assumes that popu-
lations are very large, our simulation results for N = 50
perfectly match the prediction (figure 3b). This is due to the
fact that selection is strong in the simulations. As a general
rule of thumb, we expect this prediction to hold whenever
the product of intensity of selection and population size
is large [38]. This relationship between infinite and finite
populations has been studied in detail elsewhere; see [39].
Note that, with conditional strategies, defection can be left
via neutral paths towards strategies that do not support any
institution and do not cooperate in the absence of insti-
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Figure 4. Time series showing a snapshot of the evolution in the complete
strategy space of 65 strategies. Different instances of stable coexistences in the
form WDC ○ C and NDC ○○ are following each other, where each strategy can
be replaced independently of the other. For instance, here NDCCD is replaced
by NDCDD before replacements within the institutional supporters take place
(from WDCCD via WDCDD to WDCDC). For the present parameter set (see
main text), 23% of institutional supporters induce cooperation in 73% of





6the game no longer needs to be optional for cooperation to
evolve [28], a potential issue with previous models [40].
Figure 3 shows the strategies in this set of 20 strategies as
well the typical evolutionary dynamics between pairs of
strategies.
Our model assumes that, if it is costly to make institutions
visible, the cost is part of the funds paid in order to establish
the institution. However, it is also possible to assume that this
cost is paid by strategies using conditional information. This
extension is discussed in the electronic supplementary
material.
3.3. Including all conditional strategies
So far, we have given arguments that allow us to focus on
specific subsets of strategies. To verify the robustness of our
findings, we also consider the full strategy set of 65 strategies
and implement the same computational evolutionary model
as before. Because this strategy space includes many new pos-
sibilities, a plethora of different combinations could evolve.
However, the same coexistence between individuals support-
ing pro-social institutions and opportunists not supporting
any institution is found again, with the same 12 stable coex-
istences as in the subset of the 20 consistent strategies
considered above. Thus, the evolutionary outcome is inde-
pendent of the choice of the strategy subset in our model
once the key opportunistic strategies are considered.
Figure 4 shows a typical time series of the dynamics with a
complete strategy space. The system spends the vast majority
of time in stable coexistences, where the strategies are
occasionally replaced by others that display the same
behaviour in this situation.
3.4. Higher thresholds for punishment implementation
When a certain number of supporters is required to
implement an institution, all players can find themselves in
groups with no punishment in place. This implies that the be-
haviour in such situations is under selection. Qualitatively,
the results remain identical to the case where punishment
can be implemented by a single supporter, k = 1, but the pos-
ition of the fixed point and the level of cooperation can
change. The structure of the game resembles a threshold
public goods game [41,42]; see electronic supplementary
material. When at least two supporters of an institution are
needed, k = 2, the equilibrium fraction of players supporting
the pro-social set-up increases from  23% (k = 1) to  43%
(k = 2). At the same time, the probability that the pool is actu-
ally implemented decreases slightly from  73% (k = 1) to
 72%. A pairwise analysis of strategies reveals that now
other coexistences are possible as well, for example between
WCCDD and NDCDD (see figure 1 for an explanation of
the strategy notation). In the electronic supplementary
material, we show that, for k = 2, all these additional coexis-
tences are unstable with respect to the invasion of a third
strategy. Only the coexistences discussed above for the case
of k = 1 remain stable against all invasions.
The equilibrium that sustains cooperation resembles that
arising in a volunteer’s dilemma [43], where the volunteering
threshold, k, represents the number of contributors required to
establish a punishment institution. We also note that the possi-
bility of these types of coexistences has been discussed in the
context of nonlinear public good games [44]. Here, we also
show that this type of coexistence is particularly resilient andcan arise with many flavours in the context of pool punish-
ment, i.e. different combinations of conditional strategies that
can resist invasions arising from a large strategy space. Our
simulations also show that this equilibrium is stable when
the population is finite and includes demographic noise.4. Discussion
We find that pro-social, but not anti-social, punishment
emerges based on individual-level selection with full sym-
metry between the two kinds of punishment institutions.
Evolutionary dynamics introduces a symmetry breaking
between the two kinds of strategies selected that favours
pro-social states. The prevalent outcome is a stable coexis-
tence between cooperators supporting a pro-social pool and
those willing to cooperate when such institutions are in
place, but not cooperating otherwise. For peer punishment,
such stable coexistences between strategies do not appear,
because they require an honest signal prior to the game
[45,46].
Typical models in evolutionary game theory restrict
themselves to a small number of strategies that seem to be
interesting from the outset, which greatly facilitates the analy-
sis [47]. While such a restriction can be highly insightful, the
conclusions from the model can in some cases strongly
depend on the strategy set [23,24,48–50]. Our computational
model implements the entire possible set of strategies in the
context of coordinated, institutional punishment. One may
be tempted to exclude strategies that seem illogical in the con-
text of the model, but this can be misguided. Selecting a
behaviour necessarily implies that other behaviours are
driven out. Therefore, the absence of behaviour should be
the result of evolutionary competition and not a result of
the modeller’s subjective choice. As shown in this paper,
strategies can have a strong impact on the evolutionary out-
come even if they do not rise to high average abundances
and only temporarily pave the way for other strategies. We
believe this robustness test is important in simple models,
which may otherwise have biased conclusions.
In our model, the maintenance of pro-social punishment
relies on a small minority which supports them, but their
robustness stems from the fact that they are constantly chal-
lenged by the presence of players that stop cooperating in




7empirically prevalent, with resilient public goods often being
supported by a minority of contributors [51]. The key to the
maintenance of the public good is the observability of insti-
tutions: only public knowledge of the presence of
punishment institutions allows the conditional strategies
that ultimately prevent the rise of anti-social behaviour,
either in the form of defection or in the form of coordinated
anti-social punishment institutions that never rise to high
abundance, but can undermine the public good.
An interesting problem arising here is the possible
effect of institutional asymmetries. For example, anti-social
institutions may entail higher costs than pro-social ones, or
implement asymmetric fines in which contributors and
non-contributors are punished differently. In particular,
anti-social institutions may offer an evolutionary advantage
if they level intrinsic asymmetries between players.
Our model is primarily concerned with the emergence
and establishment of primitive institutions, thus we do not
explicitly model implementation details. Instead, we assume
that, once implemented, institutions for punishment will
work as expected. In reality, additional issues may also
arise, e.g. due to corruption [8,52,53] or group heterogeneity[54]. Asymmetries, in particular, have been shown to be
important in infinite populations [55]. The tools necessary to
study finite evolutionary dynamics arising from asymmetric
games are not fully developed yet [56].
Most modern societies put law enforcement into the
hands of institutions and do not allow their citizens to
punish others directly. Our model suggests that our instinct
against taking the law into our own hands is justified: the
value of the signal conferred by the presence of pro-social
punishment institutions may be crucial in promoting the
kind of cooperation observed in humans.
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